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Abstract
This paper develops a model of settlement system to study the endogenous structure of settlement
networks, and the welfare consequences of clearing agent failure. The equilibrium degree of
tiering is endogenously determined by the cost structure and the information structure. The degree
of tiering is decreasing in the ﬁxed cost of operating the second-tier network and the availability
of public credit history. Furthermore, the welfare effects of clearing agent failure can be
decomposed into operational inefﬁciency and the loss of private information.
JEL classiﬁcation: E42, E58, G21
Bank classiﬁcation: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Résumé
Les auteurs élaborent un modèle en vue d’étudier la structure endogène des systèmes de
règlement et l’incidence de la défaillance d’un agent de compensation sur le bien-être. La mesure
dans laquelle les débiteurs utilisent les services d’un agent de compensation à l’équilibre pour
régler leurs paiements, c’est-à-dire le degré de participation indirecte au système, est déterminée
de façon endogène par la structure de coûts et la structure informationnelle. Le degré de
participation indirecte varie en raison inverse du coût ﬁxe d’exploitation du deuxième niveau du
système et de la disponibilité publique des antécédents de crédit. En outre, les coûts qu’entraîne la
défaillance d’un agent de compensation sur le plan du bien-être peuvent être décomposés en deux
éléments : l’inefﬁcience opérationnelle et la perte d’information privée.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E42, E58, G21
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Systèmes de paiement, de compensation et de règlement1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to build an analytically tractable model to study the endogenous
degree of tiering and the welfare e®ects of clearing agent failure. In particular, this paper
focuses on the following questions: (i) Why do settlement networks exhibit tiered struc-
ture? (ii) How is the equilibrium degree of tiering determined? (iii) What are the welfare
consequences of the failure of clearing agents?
Settlement networks typically involve various tiers of intermediation. Some banks partic-
ipate and clear directly in a \¯rst-tier" network. A subset of these direct clearers (DC) then
act as clearing agents (CA) by operating a \second-tier" network and providing settlement
accounts to downstream indirect clearers (IC). Tiered structures are observed in most pay-
ments systems, large as well as retail, in industrialized countries. In Canada, for example,
both LVTS and ACSS exhibit a high degree of tiering. The e±ciency and risk associated
with these tiered settlement networks are of particular interest to policy makers. For exam-
ple, what are the welfare e®ects of the failure of a clearing agent in a highly tiered settlement
system? How are these e®ects di®erent from the failure of an ordinary direct clearer? This
paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model to study these questions.
While policy makers care about the e±ciency and stability of settlement systems, guid-
ance provided by economic theory has been limited. Standard Walrasian models abstract
from the mechanism through which payments and settlement take place and thus are not
suitable tools for settlement system modeling. In particular, there is little theoretical work
studying the tiered structure in settlement systems. One exception is Kahn and Roberds
(2002) who models tiering as an e±cient outcome in a static model with limited enforcement.
Our paper builds on the same idea to develop a dynamic equilibrium model for studying the
degree of tiering and welfare e®ects of clearing agent failure. Other related papers include
Lai, Chande, and O'Connor (2006) and Chapman and Martin (2007). In a partial equi-
librium model, Lai, Chande, and O'Connor (2006) analyzes the contractual arrangements
between clearing agents and indirect clearers. In a monetary model with moral hazard,
Chapman and Martin (2007) studies e±cient arrangements for liquidity provision by central
2banks. They show that the optimal arrangement may exhibit a tiered structure.1
We aim to construct an analytically tractable model of a settlement system in which the
settlement structure is determined endogenously. Our model builds on two basic compo-
nents: private information regarding participants' credit-worthiness, and economies of scale
in the participation of the settlement system.2 In the model, the economy consists of a trad-
ing sector and a settlement sector. In the trading sector, agents meet bilaterally to trade
consumption goods ¯nanced by private liabilities. In the settlement sector, agents interact
to clear and settle these payment instruments. Due to consumption and production shocks,
underlying transactions in the trading sector generate the bilateral random payments °ows
in a settlement network. In this environment, the mode of settlement (i.e. real-time vs.
deferred) and the structure of settlement networks (i.e. direct or indirect participation) are
endogenously determined by underlying agents, subject to the fundamental cost structure
and information structure.
Let us explain the basic idea of the model. The choice of settlement mode between
real-time and deferred settlement involves the fundamental trade-o® between liquidity costs
and default risk. On the one hand, since real-time settlement imposes a higher liquidity
cost, payment senders (debtors) prefer to choose deferred settlement. On the other hand,
owing to the settlement risk involved, payment recipients (creditors) are willing to accept
deferred settlement only from creditworthy payment senders. So the choice of settlement
mode depends critically on whether creditors possess reliable information about debtors'
credit history. This informational constraint is particularly binding for trades involving
\small" agents who lack publicly observable credit history, and who have only infrequent
1Much of the practitioner-oriented literature on payment system design is based on payment system
simulators such as the one developed by the Bank of Finland (BoF-PSS2). Because they do not model
system participants behavior, these tools are not appropriate for studying the endogenous formation of
tiered networks.
2To motivate the relevance of private information, note that while all clearing agents and direct clearers
have high credit ratings, many indirect clearers have relatively low ratings or do not have ratings. Also, many
participants in the ACSS indicate that \the familiarity that one direct participant has with its counterparts
creates the `mutual trust" that is critical to a system that operates on implicit interbank credit" (Tripartite
Study Group, 2006). To see the relevance of economies of scale, note that direct clearers indicated that \they
need su±cient volume to achieve the operating economies necessary to lower their internal per payment costs"
(Tripartite Study Group, 2006).
3trading among each other. As a result, some of the small but safe debtors without public
history will be forced to use early settlement. This is ine±cient because the unnecessary
liquidity costs lead to suboptimal allocation of resources.
This ine±ciency can be resolved by having \large" institutions working as clearing agents
for other small agents. By having a portfolio of diversi¯ed projects, large agents' own
creditworthiness are public information. By having frequent dealings with debtors, these
large institutions can monitor debtors' credit history and optimally choose the settlement
mode for each of them. This is the information role of clearing agents. In addition to this
information role, when there are ¯xed costs associated with settlement system participation,
clearing agents can also enjoy economies of scale and play a cost-saving role in a settlement
network.
The main ¯ndings of our paper can be summarized as follows. First, we show that, in the
presence of a non-convex cost structure and information imperfection, the tiered structure
can improve e±ciency by supporting cost saving and inter-bank monitoring. Second, the
degree of tiering is decreasing in the ¯xed cost of operating the second-tier network and
the availability of public credit history. Third, clearing agent failure leads to welfare costs,
which can be decomposed into information loss and operational ine±ciency. In particular,
the failure will lead to a persistent loss of valuable private information regarding indirect
clearers' creditworthiness. The welfare and trades will recover gradually as indirect clearers
rebuild their reputation gradually over time.
Here is the plan of the paper. Section (2) establishes the ine±ciency of direct settlement.
Section (3) derives the equilibrium degree of tiering and shows that indirect settlement
can improve welfare. Section (4) derives the welfare e®ects of clearing agent failure and
decomposes the welfare cost of the failure and section (5) concludes the paper.
42 Direct Settlement
In this section, we will ¯rst consider a benchmark economy in which agents settle their debt
directly (i.e., all agents are DCs). In this economy, all agents are \small" and are subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. In the next section, we will introduce large agents into the economy to
work as clearing agents and allow indirect settlement.
2.1 The Economic Environment
Time is discrete and denoted t = 0;1;2;:::. Each period is further divided into three sub-
periods, denoted by s = 1;2;3. We use time subscript \ts" to denote the sth subperiod
of time period t. There is a measure N continuum of agents, indexed by i 2 [0;N]. The
economy consists of a home island, a trading island and a settlement island. There are two
types of goods, x and y. In sub-period s = 1, agents trade good x in the trading island. In
sub-period s = 2;3, agents settle their debt by using good y in the settlement island. We
will use xts(i) and yts(i) to denote the production of good x and y respectively by agent i in
sub-period ts. Similarly, we will use xc
ts(i) and yc
ts(i) to denote the consumption of good x
and y respectively by agent i in sub-period ts.
Home Island
At the beginning of a period, agents start on the home island. Each agent i faces an
i.i.d. random shock, ®t(i), regarding his consumption and production pattern in the current
period. With a probability ¾ = 1
2, an agent is able to produce good x and willing to consume
good y. We label this agent as a creditor. With a probability 1¡¾ = 1
2, an agent is willing to
consume good x and is endowed with a production project that produces good y (discussed
below). We label this agent as a debtor. We use ®t(i) = 1 and ®t(i) = 0 to denote respectively
the trading status of being a debtor and a creditor.
Trading Island
In sub-period 1, after the shock ®t(i) realized, agents leave the home island for the
trading island. Agents are subject to pairwise random matching in this island: each creditor
5is randomly matched with a debtor. We denote the match partner of agent i by ¶t(i). When
debtor i is paired with creditor j = ¶t(i) , debtor i may issue a personal IOU which promises
to repay dts(i) units of good y to the holder in sub-period s = 2 or s = 3. After trade, agents
go back to the home island.
Settlement Island
In both sub-period 2 and 3, agents start on the home island where debtors' production
projects yield good y. The settlement island then opens. In the settlement island, debtors
settle their IOUs using good y. In particular, debtor i pays yt2 = dt2(i) to the holder of his
debt in sub-period 2, and pays yt3 = dt3(i) to the holder of his debt in sub-period 3. There
is an enforcement technology to ensure debtors will redeem their IOUs issued in the current
period subject to their resource constraint.3 Attending this settlement island is costly. There
is a per period ¯xed utility cost, C, for an agent to attend the settlement island. The decision
to participate in the settlement island is made at the beginning of each period.
Debtors
A debtor wants to consume good x and has a project that produces good y. Denote the
quantity of good x consumption in sub-period t1 by xc





Here, the utility function for good x is linear. Also, ºt(i) = 1 and ºt(i) = 0 denote
respectively whether or not agent i attends the settlement island.
Creditors
A creditor is able to produce good x and wants to consume good y. Denote creditor j's
production of good x in sub-period t1 as xt1(j) and the consumption of good y in sub-period
t2 and t3 as yc
t2(j) and yc
t3(j) respectively. Creditor j's one period payo® is given by:
3In this model, agents are able to commit to settle their IOUs issued in the current period. Strategic





t3(j) ¡ xt1(j) ¡ ºt(j)C:
Here, the cost of producing good x and the utility from consuming good y are both linear.
Projects
Each debtor i is endowed with a project which yields 1 unit of good y in sub-period 3 with
a probability pt(i) (discussed below), and yields 0 unit of good y with the complementary
probability. The debtor can also choose to terminate and liquidate the project earlier and
yield ¼ < 1 units of good y in sub-period 2 for sure. The debtor's discrete liquidation choice
is captured by et(i) 2 f1;0g. With early liquidation denoted by et(i) = 1, and no early
liquidation denoted by et(i) = 0, the good y output by debtor i is given by
(yt2(i);yt3(i)) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(0;1) with probability pt(i);
(0;0) with probability 1 ¡ pt(i);
(¼;0);
if et(i) = 0
if et(i) = 0
if et(i) = 1
2.2 The Sequence of Events
The following table and Figure (1) summaries the time-line of the sequence of events.
Events Island Debtor Creditor
s = 1 home 1. Agent i pays cost C or not 1. Agent j pays cost C or not
home 2. Agent i receives preference shock 2. Agent j receives preference shock
trading 3. Buys xc
t1 with dt2 or dt3 3. Sells xt1 for dt2 or dt3
s = 2 home 4. Terminates project and yields ¼ 4. No Action
settlement 5. Settles yt2 = dt2 early 5. Receives yc
t2 = dt2 early
home 6. Debtor i dies or not 6. Debtor ¶t(j) dies or not
s = 3 home 7. Project matures and yields 1 7. No Action
settlement 8. Settles yt3 = dt3 late 8. Receives yc
t3 = dt3 late
home 9. Exogenous exit or not 9. Exogenous exit or not
71. Participation Decision in s = 1
In the home island, each agent decides whether to pay C to participate in the settlement
island.
2. Preference shock in s = 1
In the home island, each agent receives a preference shock that determining whether he
















































3. Debtors making o®ers in s = 1
Agents are subject to pairwise random matching in the trading island. Each debtor is
randomly matched with a creditor. The terms of trade are determined by take-it-or-leave-it
o®ers by the debtors which consist of (xt1;dt1;dt2) 2 <3
+. Here, xt1 denotes the quantities of
good x the debtor asks the creditor to produce. Also, a debtor o®ers personal IOUs which
promise certain quantities of good y, dts, to the creditor. Creditor j then chooses whether
8to accept or reject the o®er to maximize her expected payo®. If creditor j accepts the o®er,
her current period payo® is
ºt(j)fdt2(j) + p
j
t(i)dt3(j)g ¡ xt1(j) ¡ ºt(j)C;
where p
j
t(i) denotes creditor j's subjective evaluation of the probability that debtor i
will repay in sub-period t3.4 Notice that a creditor can receive the repayment of good y,
yc
ts = dts, only if the creditor pays the ¯xed participation cost C. Therefore, a creditor j will




4. Termination of projects in s = 2
At the beginning of sub-period 2, debtors can choose to terminate their projects and get
liquidation value ¼ in the home island.
5. Early settlement in s = 2
If dt2(i) > 0 (i.e., early IOUs are issued), debtor i terminates his project and attends the
settlement sector in s = 2 to redeem his IOUs from the the holders by paying yt2 = dt2(i). A
creditor holding early IOUs attends the settlement island to get repayment. Agents return
to the home island after settlement.
6. Debtor failure in s = 2
At the end of sub-period 2, a debtor may die exogenously, and any unliquidated project
will fail. This will induce settlement failure if dt3(i) > 0 (i.e., deferred settlement is used).
The probability of receiving this settlement shock depends on an agent's intrinsic type. There
are two types of agents (exogenously determined when they enter the economy). Fraction °
4Given the assumption of perfect enforcement, debtors cannot choose to default strategically. Here,
debtors fail to repay in sub-period t3 only because of the exogenous shock discussed below.
9of them will never die at the end of sub-period s = 2. We label them as \good" type agents.
The remaining fraction 1¡° will die at the end of sub-period s = 2 with probability 1 when
they are debtors.5 We label them as \bad" type agents. When an agent enters the economy,
the true type of this agent is unknown for everyone.
Note that the past trading history of an agent can help to predict his probability of being
a bad type (i.e., having a settlement problem). In particular, for an agent who is a debtor for
the ¯rst time, the probability that this agent is of bad type and dies at the end of sub-period
2 is 1¡° < 1. We call it a risky agent. For an agent who was a debtor before, the probability
that he is of good type is 1. We call this agent a safe agent. Therefore, the sequence of past
trading statuses of an agent can reveal whether he is safe or risky. In particular, agent i is
safe in period t if ®¿(i) = 1 for some ¿ < t. Otherwise, agent i is risky.
7. Projects mature in s = 3
At the beginning of sub-period 3, if a debtor with an unliquidated project survives in
sub-period 3, he will be endowed with one unit of good y in the home island.
8. Late settlement in s = 3
If dt3(i) > 0 (i.e., late IOUs are issued), debtor i will attend the settlement island to
redeem his IOUs from the the holders by paying yt3 = dt3(i). A creditor holding late IOUs
attends the settlement island to get repayment. Agents return to the home island after
settlement.
9. Exogenous death in s = 3
In order to maintain a stationary distribution, we assume that, at the end of each period,
a random fraction ± of agents exits the economy and is replaced by a set of new agents. Also,
those debtors who die and default are replaced by new agents.6 Denote the fraction of safe
households by ¤. As illustrated in Figure 27, the stationarity of distribution implies that
5We make this strong assumption for tractability reasons. We expect that relaxing this assumption will
not a®ect the qualitative result.
6New agents are drawn from the unconditional distribution as follows: (i) a fraction °h are public agents
of good type, (ii) a fraction °(1 ¡ h) are anonymous agents of good type, (iii) a fraction (1 ¡ °)h are public
agents of bad type, and (iv) a fraction (1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ h) are anonymous agents of bad type.
7The debtor-creditor nodes under the \safe" branch are not shown in the ¯gure, since it will not a®ect
the °ows.
10¤ = ¤(1 ¡ ±) + (1 ¡ ¤)¾°(1 ¡ ±)
=
¾°(1 ¡ ±)



































Figure 2: Stationary Distribution
2.3 Equilibrium with Direct Settlement
Public and Anonymous Agents
Here, we assume that agents are di®erent in terms of the observability of whether they
are safe or risky. In particular, the population is partitioned into two subsets. For a fraction
h of the population, whether they are safe or risky are publicly observable. We label them
11as public agents. This subset of agents is denoted by H.
The remaining fraction (1 ¡h) are anonymous. This subset of agents is the complement
of H and is denoted by ~ H. To ensure that anonymous agents do not have public trading
histories, we make the following technical assumption: at the beginning of each period, each
anonymous agent is randomly assigned an identity i from the set ~ H, with this identity i being
private information. Since the identity of an anonymous agent changes randomly over time,
the past history of his trading statuses is also private information.
Consider a meeting in the trading island in which a debtor o®ers dt3 > 0 to a creditor.
Denote f as the unconditional probability of this debtor being a good type (i.e., who will not
default on this IOU which will be settled in sub-period 3). This will happen if the debtor is
either safe (with a probability ¤) or is risky but good (with a probability (1 ¡ ¤)°).
From now on, we will impose the restriction on parameter values such that the liquidation
value of a project is higher than the unconditional expected value of a matured project:
Assumption: ¼ > f = ¤ + (1 ¡ ¤)°
Under this assumption, an anonymous debtor is able to promise more good y in expected
terms by liquidating the project and settling early at s = 2 than by having the project
matured and settling late at s = 3.
Given the structure of our model, no long term relationship is possible between any two
agents. Apparently, the relevant individual state variable for each agent is whether he is risky
(denoted by `0') or safe (denoted by `1'). Depending on whether the agent is anonymous
or not, this may or may not be public information. For a public debtor, all agents can
tell whether he is risky or safe. For an anonymous debtor, his trading partner cannot tell
whether he is risky or safe. We will now consider the decision by the public agents and then
by the anonymous agents.
Public agents






1 ¡ ºC + (1 ¡ ±)V1];




º(1 ¡ e) ¸ d3
Since an agent has bargaining power and gets trade surplus only when he is a debtor, we
only need to consider the payo® when he is a debtor. A public agent needs to choose whether
to participate in the settlement island (º), what to o®er when he is a debtor (xc
1;d2;d3), and
whether to liquidate the project (e) to maximize his current payo® ¾xc
1 ¡ ºC, plus the con-
tinuation value (1¡±)V1. This public agent will survive to the next period with a probability
1 ¡ ±. The ¯rst constraint is the participation constraint of the trading partner who is a
creditor. The second and third constraint are the feasibility constraints for settlement. Since
this agent is safe and has public history, he will settle a late IOU for sure when he is a debtor,





1 = 1;d2 = 0;d3 = 1;e = 0;º = 1
xc
1 = 0;d2 = 0;d3 = 0;e 2 f0;1g;º = 0
, if ¾ ¸ C
, if ¾ < C






1 ¡ ºC + ¾°(1 ¡ ±)V1 + (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)V0];




º(1 ¡ e) ¸ d3
13Here, this agent is risky, implying that he will settle a late IOU with a probability °
when he is debtor, and his creditor knows that. With a probability ¾°(1 ¡ ±), the risky
agent is a debtor and survives to the following period as a safe agent. With a probability
(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±), the risky agent is a creditor and survives to the following period as a risky
agent. Under the above assumption, we have ¼ > f > °. Therefore, early settlement yields





1 = ¼;d2 = ¼;d3 = 0;e = 1;º = 1
xc
1 = 0;d2 = 0;d3 = 0;e 2 f0;1g;º = 0
, if ¾¼ ¸ C
, if ¾¼ < C
Anonymous agents
Since the trading history of an anonymous debtor is not observable by other agents,
the creditor cannot tell whether the debtor is risky or safe. The creditor has to use the
unconditional probability, f, to evaluate the probability of receiving a late settlement.
Denote the expected discounted value of a safe anonymous agent by ~ V1. We have






1 ¡ ºC + (1 ¡ ±)~ V1
i
;




º(1 ¡ e) ¸ d3





1 = ¼;d2 = ¼;d3 = 0;e = 1;º = 1
xc
1 = 0;d2 = 0;d3 = 0;e 2 f0;1g;º = 0
, if ¾¼ ¸ C
, if ¾¼ < C
Denote the expected discounted value of a risky anonymous agent by ~ V0. We have






1 ¡ ºC + ¾°(1 ¡ ±)~ V1 + ¾(1 ¡ ±)~ V0
i
;




º(1 ¡ e) ¸ d3





1 = ¼;d2 = ¼;d3 = 0;e = 1;º = 1
xc
1 = 0;d2 = 0;d3 = 0;e 2 f0;1g;º = 0
, if ¾¼ ¸ C
, if ¾¼ < C
Here, we focus on symmetric stationary equilibria (SSE) with direct settlement in which
agents trade, and agents of the same types make the same participation and trading decision.
Therefore,we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique SSE with direct settlement when ¾¼ ¸ C.
The good 1 consumption of the three types of debtors are
Types Measure xc
Anonymous debtors N(1 ¡ h) ¼
Risky public debtors Nh(1 ¡ ¤) ¼
Safe public debtors Nh¤ 1
Since the creditors have zero trade surplus, the welfare measured by average current
period payo® is given by W = ¾(h[¤ + (1 ¡ ¤)¼] + (1 ¡ h)¼) ¡ C.
Information imperfection and infrequent trading between agents imply that safe anony-
mous debtors are unable to induce creditors to use deferred settlement. This will imply
ine±cient use of early settlement with the welfare loss equal to ¾(1¡h)¤(1¡¼). Therefore,
whenever past trading history is imperfect (h < 1), direct settlement is ine±cient because
of the pre-matured liquidation.
153 Indirect Settlement
Owing to the lack of public history, allocation in an equilibrium with direct settlement is not
e±cient because the anonymous safe households are forced to liquidate their projects even
though there is no risk of default. This allocation can be improved by introducing clearing
agents to keep track of agents' past histories.
3.1 Clearing Agents
We now introduce some large households into the economy to study the role of clearing
agents and the tiered settlement structure. Suppose, among the measure N of agents, there
are M < N households. Each household consists of a coalition of measure one of agents
from a representative sample of the population. Therefore, a household can survive forever,
even though at the end of each period a subset of its members (of measure (1¡¤)¾(1¡° +
±°) + ¤± < 1) dies and is replaced by a set of new members.
These large households can choose to become clearing agents who o®er settlement services
to other small agents in the home island. The settlement technology allows each household
to interact with a positive mass, n, of small agents in the home island at a utility cost D(n)
per member, with ´(0) = ´0 > 0, ´0 ¸ 0, ´00 ¸ 0. Each client of a clearing agent is given
an account, which only the account owner can have access to operate. By having repeated
dealings with the account owner and by keeping track of each account's trading history, a
clearing agent is able to identify whether the account owner is safe or risky.
A clearing agent provides two basic functions: (1) issues IOUs to clients who are debtors
and promise to redeem these IOUs in the settlement island, and (2) settle IOUs issued by
other clearing agents for the clients who are creditors.
3.2 The Sequence of Events
The following table and Figure 3 summaries the time-line of the sequence of events when
clearing agents are used. Here, we use i and j to denote a typical debtor and creditor
16respectively, and CA I and CA J to denote their clearing agents respectively.
Time Island Events
s = 1 home 1. Households choose to become clearing agents or not
home Agents choose direct or indirect settlement
home 2. Agents receive preference shock
home Debtor i trade dts(i) for Dts(I) with clearing agent I
trading 3. Debtor i buys xc
t1(i) with Dt2(I) or Dt3(I) from creditor j
s = 2 home 4. Debtor i terminates projects, settles dt2(i) with clearing agents I
home Creditor j trades Dt2(I) for Dt2(J) with clearing agent J
settlement 5. Clearing agent I settles Dt2(I) with clearing agent J
home 6. Debtor i dies or not
home Clearing agent J settles Dt2(J) with creditor j
s = 3 home 7. Project matures. Debtor i settles dt3(i) with clearing agents I
home Creditor j trades Dt3(I) for Dt3(J) with clearing agent J
settlement 8. Clearing agent I settles Dt3(I) with clearing agent J
home Creditor j trades Dt2(I) for Dt2(J) with clearing agent J
home 9. Clearing agent J settles Dt2(J) with creditor j
home Exogenous exit or not
1. Participation Decision in s = 1
In the home island, each small agent chooses between being a
(i) Small Direct Clearer (SDC): to use direct settlement by paying a ¯xed cost C,
(ii) Indirect Clearer (IC): to use indirect settlement by attaching to a clearing agent,
(iii) Non-Trader (NT): not to trade.
Each household chooses between being a
(i) Direct Clearer (LDC): to use direct settlement by paying a ¯xed cost C,
(ii) Clearing Agent (CA): to serve n indirect clearers by paying ´(n) and the ¯xed cost C.


















































debtor i creditor j




















debtor i debtor i
Figure 3: Time-line
18An agent who chooses to become a small indirect clearer will choose a clearing agent and
make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er Á to that clearing agent (in terms of good x to be paid in
sub-period 2). Here, Á captures the intermediation fee promised by the indirect clearer to
the clearing agent.
2. Preference shock in s = 1
In the home island, each agent receives a preference shock that determines whether he
is a creditor or a debtor. Debtor i using indirect settlement makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er
(dts(i);Dts(I)) to clearing agent I, with s = 2 or 3. Here, debtor i asks clearing agent I for
Dts(I) units of I' IOUs which promises to pay the holder good y in sub-period s. Similarly,
dts(i) is the quantity of debtor i's IOUs given to clearing agent I, which promises to pay
back good y at the beginning of sub-period s. Clearing agent I decides to accept or not.
3. Debtors making o®ers in s = 1
Agents are subject to pairwise random matching in the trading island. Debtors using in-
direct settlement will trade by o®ering clearing agents' IOUs. Debtors using direct settlement
will trade by issuing their own IOUs. Creditors decide to accept or not.
4. Termination of projects in s = 2
At the beginning of sub-period 2, debtors can choose to terminate their projects and get
a liquidation value ¼ in the home island. Creditor j using indirect settlement will make a
take-it-or-leave-it o®er (Dt2(I);Dt2(J)) to clearing agent J. Here, creditor j o®ers Dt2(I)
units of clearing agents I's IOUs to clearing agent J. In return, creditor j asks clearing
agent J for Dt2(J) units of J' own IOUs which promises to pay back good y at the end of
sub-period 2. Clearing agent J decides to accept or not.
5. Early settlement in s = 2
Agents using direct settlement and clearing agents attend the settlement island to settle
early IOUs held by other agents and clearing agents if dt2(i) > 0 or Dt2(I) > 0.
6. Debtor failure in s = 2
At the end of sub-period 2, a debtor may die exogenously, and any unliquidated project
will fail. At the same time, creditor j holding Dt2(J) will settle with his clearing agent J.
197. Projects mature in s = 3
At the beginning of sub-period 3, If a debtor with an unliquidated project survives in
sub-period 3, he will be endowed with one unit of good y in the home island. Creditor j using
indirect settlement will make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er (Dt3(I);Dt3(J)) to clearing agent J.
Clearing agent J decides to accept or not.
8. Late settlement in s = 3
Agents using direct settlement and clearing agents attend the settlement island to settle
late IOUs held by other agents and clearing agents if dt3(i) > 0 or Dt3(I) > 0.
9. Exogenous death in s = 3
At the end of sub-period 3, creditor j holding Dt3(J) will settle with his clearing agent
J. Also, a random fraction ± of agents exits the economy and is replaced by a set of new
agents. Also, those debtors who die and default are replaced by new agents.
Decision Nodes
The trading and settlement decision of direct clearers (SDC) are the same as those in the
last section, so the following discussion will only focus on the decision of indirect clearers
(IC). Under the assumption of perfect enforcement, creditors, debtors and clearing agents
will always settle their IOUs at point (4), (6), (7), (8), (9) in the above sequence of events.
Basically, there are only ¯ve decision nodes we need to examine:
(i) Home island, s = 1 [(1) in sequence of events]: Households choose between LDC,
CA, and NT. Small agents choose between SDC, IC, and NT.
(ii) Home island, s = 1 [(2) in sequence of events]: Debtor i makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o®er (dts(i);Dts(I)), to clearing agent I. Given (dts(i);Dts(I)), clearing agent
I chooses whether to accept or not agent i's o®er.
(iii) Trading island, s = 1 [(3) in sequence of events]: Holding (Dt2(I);Dt3(I)),
debtor i makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er (~ xt1(j); ~ Dt2(I); ~ Dt3(I)) to creditor j, subject
to ~ Dts(I) · Dts(I). Creditor j chooses whether to accept an o®er or not.
20(iv) Home island, s = 2 [(4) in sequence of events]: Holding Dt2(I), creditor j makes a
take-it-or-leave-it o®er ( ~ Dt2(I); ~ Dt2(J)) to clearing agent J, subject to ~ Dt2(I) · Dt2(I).
Clearing agent J chooses whether to accept an o®er or not.
(v) Home island, s = 3 [(7) in sequence of events]: Holding Dt3(I), creditor j makes a
take-it-or-leave-it o®er ( ~ Dt3(I); ~ Dt3(J)) to clearing agent J, subject to ~ Dt3(I) · Dt3(I).
Clearing agent J chooses whether to accept an o®er or not.
Recall that an agent is risky if it has not been a debtor before. An agent is safe if it has
been a debtor before and did not fail. Besides, we will denote an anonymous agent as having
a a credit history if there exists a clearing agent who knows that this agent is safe (i.e. the
agent was served by the clearing agent in the past when it was a debtor).
The Appendix shows the following results:
² At decision node (ii), the o®er from debtor i to clearing agent I is (d2(i); d3(i); D2(I);
D3(I)) = (¼;0;¼;0), if i is a public risky debtor or if i is an anonymous debtor without
credit history. And (d2(i);d3(i);D2(I);D3(I))= (0;1;0;1) if i is a safe debtor, or if i
is an anonymous debtor with credit history. All these o®ers are accepted by clearing
agents.
² At decision node (iii), the o®er from debtor i to creditor j is (x1(j);D2(I);D3(I))=
(¼;¼;0), if i is a public risky debtor or if i is an anonymous debtor without credit history.
And (x1(j);D2(I);D3(I)) = (1;0;1), if i is a safe debtor, or if i is an anonymous debtor
with credit history. All these o®ers are accepted by creditors.
² At decision node (iv) and (v), the o®er from creditor j to clearing agent J is Ds(I) =
Ds(J). All these o®ers are accepted by clearing agents.
Now, we discuss the decisions at decision node (i). Denote the equilibrium number of
clearing agents by A · M. There are two equilibrium outcomes, depending on whether the
public agents choose to use clearing agents or not. If all the public agents choose to become
21indirect clearers by attaching to clearing agents, then the number of clients per clearing





Since small agents make take-it-or-leave-it o®ers to clearing agents, the equilibrium interme-






The free entry condition of clearing agents is such that clearing agents earns non-negative





















If all the public agents choose to become direct clearers and not to use clearing agents,
then the number of clients per clearing agents is given by
n =
(N ¡ M)(1 ¡ h)
A
: (4)
Also, the equilibrium fee is given by
Á = ´
0(
(N ¡ M)(1 ¡ h)
A
); (5)
and the free entry condition of clearing agents implies
8This is true only when M is su±ciently large such that A · M is not binding. From now on, we assume
that this is true.




(N ¡ M)(1 ¡ h)
A
) ¡ ´(








(N ¡ M)(1 ¡ h)
A + 1
) ¡ ´(
(N ¡ M)(1 ¡ h)
A + 1
): (6)
Now, we consider the decision between direct settlement (SDC), indirect settlement (IC)
and no trade (NT) of small agents at node (i). We ¯rst consider the decision of public agents
and then that of anonymous agents.9
Small public agents
Since public agents possess public history of trading statuses, they will get the same
terms of trade whether they use clearing agents or direct settlement. So their only concern is
whether using clearing agents can reduce the settlement cost. So they will prefer IC rather
than SDC if C ¸ Á. Also, a public safe agent will choose not to trade when the gain from
trade is lower than the cost of using direct or indirect settlement (i.e., ¾ · minfÁ;Cg).
Similarly, a public risky agent will choose not to trade when ¾¼ · minfÁ;Cg). Therefore, a
public safe agent's optimal choice at node (i) is
8
> > > <




, if minfC;¾g ¸ Á;
, if minfÁ;¾g ¸ C;
, if minfÁ;Cg ¸ ¾:
(7)
A public risky agent's optimal choice at node (i) is
9Note that large households do not have incentives to use clearing agents because the total cost of direct
settlement is C and thus the average cost of direct settlement per member is zero. Therefore, large households
will always prefer being a LDC to NT.
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, if minfC;¾¼g ¸ Á;
, if minfÁ;¾¼g ¸ C;
, if minfÁ;Cg ¸ ¾¼:
(8)
So, all public agents trade if
minfÁ;Cg · ¾¼: (9)
Small anonymous agents
An anonymous agent's decision depends on whether they are safe or risky, and whether
he has a credit history (i.e., some clearing agents know that the agent is safe). As a result,
at the beginning of a period, there are three types of anonymous agents:
(i) risky agents (denoted by subscript \00"): who has not been a debtor before;
(ii) safe agents without credit history (denoted by subscript \10"): who are safe but no
clearing agents know
(iii) safe agents with credit history (denoted by subscript \11"): who are safe and some
clearing agents know that.
We denote the beginning-of-the-period expected payo® of these three types by ~ V00; ~ V10; ~ V11
respectively:
24~ V00 = maxf(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)~ V00 + ¾[¼ + (1 ¡ ±)° ~ V11] ¡ Á;
(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)~ V00 + ¾[¼ + (1 ¡ ±)° ~ V10] ¡ C;
(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ¾(1 ¡ °))~ V00g
~ V10 = maxf(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)~ V10 + ¾[¼ + (1 ¡ ±)~ V11] ¡ Á;
(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)~ V10 + ¾[¼ + (1 ¡ ±)~ V10] ¡ C;
(1 ¡ ±)~ V10g (10)
~ V11 = maxf(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)~ V11 + ¾[1 + (1 ¡ ±)~ V11] ¡ Á;
(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)~ V11 + ¾[¼ + (1 ¡ ±)~ V11] ¡ C;
(1 ¡ ±)~ V11g
Here, each agent needs to decide whether to pay Á to become a IC, to pay C to become
a SDC, or choose not to trade (NT). For example, the ¯rst equation represents the choice
of a risky debtor between direct settlement, indirect settlement, and no trade. The tradeo®
is that a direct clearer pays a cost C while an indirect clearer pays a cost Á and may get a
higher continuation value ~ V11 when he is a creditor and survives. Note that, implicitly, we
assume that an agent is always served by those clearing agents possessing his credit history.
In the Appendix, it is shown that small anonymous agents always choose indirect settle-
ment if
¢ ¡ Á ¸ maxfC;¡¾¼g; (11)
where ¢ = ¾(1 ¡ ±)°
¾(1¡¼)
1¡¾(1¡±) ¸ 0. In particular, small anonymous agents prefer being a
IC to a SDC if
25¢ + (C ¡ Á) ¸ 0:
Here, the term in the inequality, ¢, captures the gain from building up the credit history
through the use of clearing agents. The second term, C ¡ Á, captures the potential cost-
saving by using clearing agents. The informational role and cost-saving role are the two
basic functions provided by clearing agents.
3.3 Equilibrium
We will focus on an equilibria in which (i) all agents trade, (ii) all small anonymous agents
choose to use indirect settlement, (iii) there are A 2 f1;2;:::;Mg clearing agents.
The previous derivation suggests that an equilibrium with indirect settlement can be
de¯ned as follows:
1. A symmetric stationary equilibrium with indirect settlement (without small direct
clearers) is given by (A¤;n¤;Á¤) satisfying , (1), (2), (3), (9), (11), C ¸ Á, and 1 ·
A¤ · M.
2. A symmetric stationary equilibrium with indirect settlement (with small direct clear-
ers) is given by (A¤;n¤;Á¤) satisfying , (4), (5), (6), (9), (11), Á ¸ C, and 1 · A¤ · M.
The ¯rst de¯nition refers to case in which all small agents choose indirect settlement
(IC). Conditions (1), (2), (3) de¯ne (A¤;n¤;Á¤). Conditions (9), (11), C ¸ Á imply that
anonymous agents choose IC. The second de¯nition has the reversed condition C · Á to
ensure that public agents prefer SDC to IC. (see Figure (4))
Under these two equilibria, the payo®s of di®erent agents are given by
26Type Measure Payo®
Clearing agents (CA) A ¾[1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¼)] + nÁ ¡ ´(n)
Large direct clearers (LDC) M-A ¾[1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¼)]
Public creditors (1 ¡ ¾)(N ¡ M)h ¡minfÁ;Cg
Anonymous creditors (1 ¡ ¾)(N ¡ M)(1 ¡ h) ¡Á
Public risky debtors ¾(N ¡ M)(1 ¡ h)(1 ¡ ¤) ¼ ¡ minfÁ;Cg
Public safe debtors ¾(N ¡ M)(1 ¡ h)¤ 1 ¡ minfÁ;Cg
Anonymous risky debtors ¾(N ¡ M)h(1 ¡ ¤) ¼ ¡ Á
Anonymous safe debtors ¾(N ¡ M)h¤ 1 ¡ Á
Apparently, the use of indirect settlement makes anonymous agents better o®. Public
agents will be better o® whenever C > Á. Again, there are two potential sources of welfare
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Figure 4: Two Equilibrium Outcomes
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Figure 5: Distribution of SSE
De¯ning the ¯xed cost of providing clearing agent services by ´0 = ´(0), one can derive
the distribution of equilibria over the parameter space (´0;C). As shown in Figure (5),
direct settlement is used when C is relatively low. As C increase, anonymous agents choose
to use indirect settlement. When C is high, both anonymous and public agents use indirect
settlement.10
3.4 Degree of Tiering
In this subsection, we derive the model implications regarding some empirical measures of
the degree of tiering. We may measure the degree of tiering by the share of settlement going
through clearing agents.11









, if C > Á
, if C < Á
The total volume of settlement is
10See the Appendix for the details of the distribution of equilibria.





= N ¡ 1 ¡ (N ¡ M)n+1
N
= N ¡ 1 ¡ (N ¡ M)n+1
N + h(N ¡ M)2+n
N
, if C > Á
, if C < Á






N )(A + N ¡ M)
(1 ¡ 1+n
N )(A + (1 ¡ h)(N ¡ M))
, if C > Á
, if C < Á
Clearing agents' share of settlement is given by




1 ¡ (M ¡ A)N¡1
N =TV
1 ¡ [h(N ¡ M) + (M ¡ A)N¡1
N ]=TV
, if C > Á
, if C < Á
The e®ects of the ¯xed cost associated with indirect settlement (´0) and the availability
of public information (h) on the equilibrium degree of tiering are summarized in the following
table.
Parameter n A CAV TV Share
C > Á ´0 " " # # # #
C > Á h " 0 0 0 0 0
C < Á ´0 " " # # # #
C < Á h " 0 # # " #
Note that the degree of tiering captured is decreasing in the ¯xed cost of operating a
settlement network. A rise in ¯xed cost (´0 ") will require each clearing agent to operate
in a larger scale (n "), reducing the equilibrium number of clearing agents (A #). The total
volume of settlement goes up because less settlement is internalized by the clearing agents
(TV#), but the total volume settled by clearing agents drops even more (CAV#). As a result,
the clearing agents' share of settlement goes down (Share#).
29Also, when C < Á, the degree of tiering is decreasing in the fraction of small households
with public history. A rise in the availability of public credit history (h ") does not a®ect
the size of each clearing agent, but reduces the number of clearing agents (A #). Since less
settlement °ows are internalized by the clearing agents, total volume goes up (TV") and
clearing agents' settlement volume goes down (CAV#). As a result, the clearing agents'
share of settlement goes down (Share#). When C > Á, all small households use indirect
settlement, so changes in h do not a®ect the two measures.
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Figure 6: Degree of Tiering ( C > Á)
304 Failure of Clearing Agents
In this section, we study the consequence of the failure of clearing agents.12 The economy
is initially in a SSE with A ¸ 1 clearing agents. Suppose at the beginning of each period, a
clearing agent may fail exogenously with a probability µ. Suppose clearing agent failure is a
random i.i.d. event and after a failure, clearing agents shut down and exit the economy. Since
clearing agent failures are low probability events, we assume that µ is close to zero. Also, we
assume that a failed clearing agent is replaced by a new household. The memory regarding
its clients' credit histories associated with the clearing agent will vanish. Apparently, in this
case agents do not have incentive to use more than one clearing agent, and the equilibrium
outcome is the same as in the previous section.13
For small public agents, clearing agent failure will not a®ect the distribution of the safe
and risky types.
Distributional change for anonymous agents
Now, we look at the distributional change among the small anonymous agents after a
one-time failure at the beginning of period 1. We use f¤00(t);¤11(t);¤10(t)g1
t=0 to denote
respectively the sequences of fractions of risky agents, safe agents with credit history, and
safe agents without credit history. Before the period 1 failure, the distribution for t < 1 is
given by
¤00(t) = 1 ¡ ¤;
¤11(t) = ¤;
¤10(t) = 0:
Denote the fraction of households a®ected by the failure as ² = ~ A=A. In period 1, as
12For simplicity, we focus on the case with C su±ciently large so that all small agents always use clearing
agents.
13In particular, if agents can only use one clearing agent in each period, then using a second clearing agent
costs an extra liquidation cost 1 ¡ ¼ without yielding any diversi¯cation gains when µ ¼ 0.
31illustrated in (7), the distribution is given by
¤00(1) = 1 ¡ ¤;
¤11(1) = (1 ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ²)¾°(1 ¡ ±) + ¤(1 ¡ ²)(1 ¡ ±);
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Figure 7: Distributional change in period t = 1
As illustrated in (8), the distribution in period t > 1 is given by
¤00(t) = 1 ¡ ¤;
¤11(t) = (1 ¡ ¤)¾°(1 ¡ ±) + ¤11(t ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ±) + ¤10(t ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ±)¾;















































Figure 8: Distributional change in period t > 1
4.1 Welfare consequence of failure
The average payo® of all agents in period t ¸ 0 is given by























; for t ¸ 1
where ¢A(t) is the total number of large households turning into new clearing agents
(exogenously) from period 1 to period t. As illustrated in this equation, there are two
potential sources of welfare loss: loss of information concerning anonymous indirect clearers'
credit history, and operational ine±ciency. Figures (9), (10) and (11) illustrate the e®ects
of clearing agent failure on the number of clearing agents, agents' credit history, volume of
33trade, as well as the average payo®s of direct clearers, indirect clearers, and clearing agents.
Case (1): No Informational Role (h = 1) and Immediate Entry of Clearing Agents
Suppose after the failure of clearing agents (marked by the cross in the ¯gure), they are
replaced by the new clearing agents immediately. Since clearing agents have no informational
roles when h = 1, there is no loss of credit history in the economy. Also, the cost-saving role
of clearing agents is not a®ected when they are replaced immediately. Therefore, a failure




















Figure 9: h = 1 and Immediate Entry of New Clearing Agents
Case (2): Informational Role (h < 1) and Immediate Entry of Clearing Agents
The failure of clearing agents implies loss of credit history of anonymous agents when
h < 1, lowering the average trades and the average welfare of indirect clearers. After the
failure in period 0, the anonymous indirect clearers whose clearing agents failed need to
switch to some other clearing agents. Since the new clearing agents do not know their credit
history, they need to rebuild their reputation again. Because households may not be debtors
every period, it takes time for all of them to rebuild their credit history.
Case (3): Informational Role (h < 1) and Gradual Entry of Clearing Agents
The failure of clearing agents implies loss of credit history, lowering the average trades




















Figure 10: h < 1 and Immediate Entry of New Clearing Agents
ine±cient operation of existing clearing services. Given the properties of ´(n), this will lower





















Figure 11: h < 1 and Gradual Entry of New Clearing Agents
Note that the special informational and cost-saving roles of clearing agents imply that
the e®ects of a failure of clearing agents is di®erent from that of a large direct clearer. In
particular, a failure of clearing agents leads to persistent loss of credit history of indirect
35clearers and operational ine±ciency which will not happen in the case of large direct clearer
failure.
5 Conclusion
Our paper shows that, in the presence of information imperfection and non-convex cost
structure, a tiered structure can improve e±ciency by supporting inter-bank monitoring
and cost-saving. A policy implication is that, restricting the degree of tiering in settlement
systems (such as LVTS and ACSS in Canada) may distort the e±cient monitoring structure
in the payment system.14 However, we also show that settlement failure may generate
negative spill over on other participants. Therefore, the equilibrium concentration and degree
of tiering may not optimally diversify the risk of clearing agent failure. The optimal payment
system policy of the central bank is a left for future research.
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36Appendices
(1) To solve for optimal decision in SSE
Given the number of clients served by each clearing agent is n, we can solve for the
optimal decision backward:
² Decision node (v)
Clearing agent J: Clearing agent J accepts an o®er, (D3(I);D3(J)), from creditor j
i® D3(I) ¸ D3(J)
Creditor j: Denote the fee charged by clearing agents as Á. Given (D3(I);x1(j)),
creditor j chooses ~ D3(J) to maximize D3(J)¡x1(j)¡Á subject to D3(I) ¸ D3(J). So
the optimal o®er is D3(J) = D3(I).
² Decision node (iv)
Clearing agent J: Clearing agent J accepts an o®er, (D2(I);D2(J)), from creditor j
i® D2(I) ¸ D2(J)
Creditor j: Given (D2(I);x1(j)), creditor j chooses D2(J) to maximize D2(J)¡x1(j)¡
Á subject to D2(I) ¸ D2(J). So the optimal o®er is D2(J) = D2(I).
² Decision node (iii)
Creditor j accepts an o®er (Ds(I);x1(j)) from debtor i i® Ds(J) = Ds(I) ¸ x1(j).
Debtor i: Given Ds(I) in hand, debtor i chooses ( ~ Ds(I);xc
1(i)) to maximize xc
1(i)
subject to Ds(I) ¸ ~ Ds(I) and ~ Ds(I) ¸ xc
1(i). So the optimal o®er is xc
1(i) = Ds(I)
and ~ D2(I) = D2(I).
² Decision node (ii)
Clearing agent I: Clearing agent I will accept an o®er, (d2(i);D2(I)) from debtor i
i® d2(i) ¸ D2(I). He will accept an o®er, (d3(i);D3(I)) from debtor i i® pI(i)d3(i) ¸
D3(I), where pI(i) is equal to 1 or ° depending on whether i is a safe or a risky debtor
(for an anonymous agent i, depending on whether he has been a debtor with I before).
Debtor i: Debtor i chooses (d2(i); d3(i); D2(I); D3(I); e(i)) to
maxx
c






(1 ¡ e(i)) ¸ d3(i)
The optimal o®er for debtor i is
37½
d2(i) = ¼;d3(i) = 0;D2(i) = ¼;D3(i) = 0;e(i) = 1
d2(i) = 0;d3(i) = 1;D2(i) = 0;D3(i) = 1;e(i) = 0
, for risky debtors
, for safe debtors
(2) To derive the conditions for SSE with indirect settlement
Risky debtors choose IC rather than SDC i® ¾(1¡±)°(~ V11¡ ~ V10) ¸ Á¡C. Safe debtors
without credit history choose IC rather than SDC i® ¾(1¡±)(~ V11¡ ~ V10) ¸ Á¡C. Safe
debtors with credit history choose IC rather than SDC i® ¾(1 ¡ ¼) ¸ Á ¡ C. Also, in
a SSE with indirect settlement,
~ V11 ¡ ~ V10 = (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)~ V11 + ¾[1 + (1 ¡ ±)~ V11] ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)~ V10 ¡ ¾[¼ + (1 ¡ ±)~ V11]
= (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)[~ V11 ¡ ~ V10] + ¾(1 ¡ ¼)
=
¾(1 ¡ ¼)
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ±)
< 1 ¡ ¼:
Note that the incentive to use indirect settlement is the lowest for the risky debtors.




1 ¡ ¾(1 ¡ ±)
+ (C ¡ Á) = ¢ + (C ¡ Á) > 0:
Similarly, agents of all types choose IC rather than NT i®
¾¼ + ¢ ¡ Á > 0:
And agents of all types choose SDC rather than NT i®
¾¼ ¡ C > 0:
(3) To derive the distribution of equilibria in the parameter space
Anonymous agents choose IC if C ¸ Á ¡ ¢, Á · ¢ + ¾¼. Choose SDC if C · Á ¡ ¢,
C · ¾¼. Choose NT if Á ¸ ¢ + ¾¼ ,C ¸ ¾¼. Public risky agents choose IC if Á · ¾¼,
C ¸ Á. Choose SDC if C · ¾¼, Á ¸ C. Choose NT if Á ¸ ¾¼, C ¸ ¾¼. Public safe agents
choose IC if Á · ¾, C ¸ Á. Choose SDC if C · ¾, Á ¸ C. Choose NT if Á ¸ ¾, C ¸ ¾.














Anonymous Public risky Public safe
a IC IC IC
b IC NT IC
c NT NT IC
d NT NT NT
e IC NT DC
f NT NT DC
g IC DC DC
h DC DC DC
(4) To derive the e®ects of ´ and h on the degree of tiering
1. The number of clearing agents:
For C > Á: A = N¡M
n which is decreasing in ´.
For C < Á: A =
(N¡M)(1¡h)
n which is decreasing in ´ and h.
2. The total volume of settlement:
For C > Á: TV= nA(N¡1¡n
N )+A(N¡1¡n
N )+(M ¡A)(N¡1
N ) = N ¡1¡
(N¡M)(n+1)
N which
is decreasing in ´.
For C < Á: TV= h(N ¡ M) + nA(N¡1¡n
N ) + A(N¡1¡n
N ) + (M ¡ A)(N¡1
N ) = N ¡ 1 ¡
(N¡M)(n+1)
N + h(N ¡ M)2+n
N
= N ¡ 1 ¡
(N¡M)(n+1)
N (1 ¡ h) +
h(N¡M)
N which is decreasing in ´ and increasing in h.
3. Clearing agents' volume of settlement:
For C > Á: CAV= nA(N¡1¡n
N )+A(N¡1¡n
N ) = A(1+n)(N¡1¡n
N ) = (A+N¡M)(1¡ 1+n
N )
which is decreasing in ´.
For C < Á: CAV= nA(N¡1¡n
N ) + A(N¡1¡n
N ) = A(1 + n)(N¡1¡n
N ) = (A + (1 ¡ h)(N ¡
M))(1 ¡ 1+n
N ) which is decreasing in ´ and h.
394. Clearing agents' share of settlement:
For C > Á: Share= 1¡[(M ¡A)(N¡1
N )]=[N ¡1¡
(N¡M)(n+1)
N ] which is decreasing in ´.






which is decreasing in ´ and h.
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